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Introduction: Leadership in Global Environmental Agreements1)
For decades, the US was perceived as a leader due to its pioneering domestic
environmental legislation and for the role it played in promoting various global
environmental agreements. It has, however, lost this image as it has failed to
ratify several important global environmental agreements. The EU, Japan,
Canada, and a mix of other countries have with various levels of enthusiasm
stepped into the leadership void. Rather than allowing the US to torpedo these
multilateral environmental agreements through its non-participation, a
fluctuating mix of states――often led by the EU and with mixed levels of
support from Canada, Japan, and other industrialized states――have resulted
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in an expanding number of conventions and protocols that have come into force
without US involvement. The US stands in a morally far weaker position
internationally on the issues in question due to its unilateral political behavior.
This article explores the reasons behind US non-participation in various
global environmental agreements as well as Canadian, Japanese, and EU
responses to the US. It begins by looking at international environmental
agreements where the US was a leader. It then explores cases where the US
has failed to ratify agreements even ones it originally supported and signed.
The analysis considers why the EU, Japan, and/or Canada, important US
trading partners, have at various times moved on without the US and what
they have and have not been able to achieve. It also attempts to take a broader
look across cases. Over time a pattern of US non-participation in multilateral
agreements has become more systematic and is no longer simply a matter of
specific environmental cases. What happens when the biggest economy
systematically resists the formulation of international environmental agree-
ments? Can international environmental agreements succeed in the long run
without the US? What options are open to other players in the international
system when the hegemon refuses to play by the rules of the game?
A Comparison of Several International Environmental Agreements
and the Roles of the US, Japan, Canada and the EU
The United States, Japan, Canada, and the EU and its member states are
parties to hundreds of international environmental agreements. There are
many agreements that one could label as being at least partially successful. In
the past few decades, the nature of the environmental problems being
addressed has changed. The highly complex, “wicked” problems of climate
change, biodiversity loss, ocean pollution, tropical deforestation, and the like are
not as easy to deal with as has been the case with earlier environmental
agreements――like the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air
Pollution, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
or the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste
and Other Matter――all cases where the US did sign and ratify the
agreements (Balint et al., 2011). Solving the more complex global environmen-
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tal problems that are symbolized by climate change, species loss, desertifica-
tion, ocean degradation, among other issues, require deep changes in existing
economic, energy and agricultural structures and in life styles and consump-
tion patterns――especially in the developed countries, but increasingly as well
in developing states. With so many actors and interests involved, the potential
for veto players to emerge is great. Domestic veto players have essentially held
successive US administrations hostage and prevented US engagement in a
growing number of international environmental regimes. The other problem is
that with these more complex problems, there has been a strong tendency
towards lowest common denominator outcomes that are not adequate for
dealing with the problems the planet is facing.
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) is a
good example of an agreement that had strong US, Canadian, and European
backing from the start in large part due to the strength of environmental
groups focused on wildlife protection in these countries. CITES has as its
primary goal the protection of species that are threatened with extinction
through a system that classifies species into different categories that afford
them different levels of protection based on how close the species is to probable
extinction. Complete bans on international trade in species and speciesʼ parts
apply to animal and plants that are recognized as endangered under the
convention. The idea for the CITES Convention originated at a meeting of the
World Conservation Union (IUCN) in 1963. The US was a key sponsor of the
CITES Convention and the text of the agreement was originally agreed to at a
meeting in Washington, D.C. in 1973. The US ratified the agreement in 1974,
Canada and the United Kingdom in 1975, Germany in 1976, and France and
Japan in 1980.
Under the rules of CITES, countries are able to formally submit reservations
to the listing of species under the various categories found within CITES. Japan
did this in relation to the African elephant, the hawksbill sea turtle, and various
whale and shark species due to the use of parts of these animals for cultural
crafts and products and traditional cuisine. This action raised some concerns
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about Japanʼs commitment to wildlife species protection. After some years, due
to its participation in CITES, Japan lifted its reservations to the listings of the
hawksbill turtle. It succeeded in coalition with several African states in having
a partial listing of the African elephant so that only elephants in some countries
are listed (Mofson, 1994). It continues to express reservations to the listing of
certain whale and shark species (Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species, n.d.), which reflects a different ethics on this question
than is found in much of Europe (outside of Norway and Iceland) and North
America (Kanagawa-Fox, 2012).
The CITES, despite controversies related to some specific species, has a
broad membership. Although there are debates within the agreement about
the best means to protect species, and its cumbersome process of adding
species to the lists, it has been relatively successful.
Stratospheric Ozone Depletion and the Development
of the Montreal Protocol
Stratospheric ozone depletion is another case where the US was a primary
driver pushing for the establishment of controls on the use of ozone depleting
substances. The stratospheric ozone layer protects the earth from excessive
ultra-violet radiation. In the early 1970s, scientists warned that chlorofluoro-
carbons (CFCs), widely used as refrigerants, propellants in aerosol sprays, in
foam products, and as a cleaning agent, were most likely causing damage to the
ozone layer.
The US was the worldʼs largest producer and user of CFCs at the time. The
scientific findings were picked up by bureaucratic experts in the US
Environment Agency and NGOs, initially within a few US states and later,
nationally. In 1978, the US introduced an initial unilateral ban of the use of
CFCs in aerosol spray cans. U.S. actors then began to work to push for an
international approach to dealing with ozone depleting chemicals. Similar bans
and controls were introduced in Europe and Japan. These were, however, too
narrow in their coverage and as the depletion of the ozone layer worsened, the
sense of crisis intensified.
After several years of preparations and negotiations, in 1985 the Vienna
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Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was formulated. Initial
signatories included the European Community, all of its then member states,
the US, and several developing countries. Noticeably absent from this list was
Japan. Japan was similarly slow to respond to the subsequent efforts to develop
a protocol, which would detail the policies and measures states would take to
phase out harmful ozone depleting substances. Until late into the negotiations,
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry resisted US and growing
European pressures to agree to restrict the use of CFCs, which Japan was now
using widely for its semi-conductor industry. Under strong pressure from the
US, however, Japan eventually relented and agreed to the terms of the
Montreal Protocol, which called for the halving the production of CFCs by 1999.
In September 1988 Japan ratified both the Vienna Convention and the
Montreal Protocol. Japan was far more involved in negotiations of subsequent
amendments to the agreement, which led to a complete phase out of the use of
CFCs by 1995 (with a lag time for developing countries).
Throughout most of the 13 years between the publication of the thesis
linking CFCs to ozone layer depletion and the formulation of the Montreal
Protocol, the US was the main supporter of international action. Japan, in
contrast, was a reluctant participant that only joined after much lobbying by
US government officials (Schreurs, 2002). The European Community was also
initially slow to respond to the issue, although by the time of the formulation of
the Vienna Convention, EU member states began to be more aware of the issue
and to become more proactive (Huber and Liberatore, 2001).
There were various reasons why the US took on a leadership role. These
include strong scientific evidence linking the use of CFCs to ozone depletion,
public pressure, and most importantly, the fact that the industry leader
(DuPont Chemicals) had developed a substitute for CFCs. As a result, US
industry was supportive of an international agreement since without one they
could suffer in international competition if unilateral policy action were forced
upon them by public opinion (Kauffman, 1997; Clark and Dickson, 2002).
Japanʼ s initial resistance to the agreement was linked to a general lack of
understanding about the consequences of ozone depletion for public health, the
lack of interest and awareness of the problem in the Environment Agency and
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among environmental groups, and considerable industrial opposition to any
kind of regulation. The Japanese governmentʼs decision to ratify the agreement
can be attributed to changing norms and US pressure (Schreurs 2002; Parson
2003).
The Montreal Protocol is now widely considered among the most successful
global environmental agreements negotiated. After joining the agreement,
Japan has cooperated quite closely with the US and the EU in efforts to
strengthen the agreement and worked with developing countries to assist
them in phasing out ozone depleting chemicals. This change in stance in
Japanʼs attitude towards ozone layer protection can be explained to some
extent by the development of a greater appreciation of the severity of the
problem. It was also an area where Japan could relatively easily combine its
expertise in developing new environmentally safer technologies with overseas
development assistance.
The Convention on International Trade in Hazardous Waste (Basel
Convention)
In the late 1980s, the strengthening of environmental controls in
industrialized countries led to a sharp increase in the costs associated with
hazardous waste disposal. One response was that industries began to ship their
hazardous waste to developing countries for cheaper disposal. Destination
countries, however, often did not have the capacity to deal properly with the
waste. Developing countries and environmental groups began to lobby for an
international solution to address this problem. The resulting Basel Convention
on International Trade in Hazardous Waste initially accepted the international
trade in hazardous waste but introduced a prior notification and consent
agreement between the shipping and receiving states before a hazardous
waste transfer be allowed. Environmental NGOs and developing countries
argued that the legalization of international hazardous waste trade was
inappropriate and an international environmental justice matter. They
subsequently pushed through amendments to the convention that resulted in a
total ban on the transfer of hazardous waste, including recyclables, from OECD
to non-OECD countries (the Basel Ban).
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The US signed the Convention in 1990 and the Senate even voted to consent
to ratification, but no domestic enabling legislation bringing US hazardous
waste law into line with the standards of the convention was passed by
Congress. The US has therefore never ratified the agreement. Japan ratified
the agreement in 1990, Canada in 1992 and the European Community in 1994.2)
The Basel Convention is one of several examples of an agreement where the
US was an early supporter, but in the end due to domestic political factors, was
unable to ratify. The agreement was nevertheless signed by a sufficient
number of states to come into force.
The Basel Convention is, moreover, an example of where the non-participa-
tion of the US enabled developing states, especially in Africa, in coalition with
environmental groups in Europe and North America to push through an
amendment (the Basel Ban) that the US would most certainly have tried to
block had it been party to the agreement. US industries objected to this
provision as it was not clear which wastes would be covered by such a ban.
Interestingly, as most of the rest of the world has signed and ratified the
Convention, the US is essentially required nevertheless to live up to its
standards as parties are not allowed to enter into bilateral hazardous waste
trade agreements that are not governed by standards at least as stringent as
those of the convention. The US has clearly lost influence due to its failure to
ratify (Bradford, 2011).
Biological Diversity and the Biodiversity Convention
The US, Japan, Canada and the EU have been divided over the question of
how to deal with biological diversity loss and the production and use of
genetically modified organisms. The Earth is a treasure trove of biological
diversity, but by fragmenting and developing land and through pollution,
humans are destroying many of the ecological systems upon which species
depend.
In the mid-1980s, the US sponsored a resolution requesting that the United
Nations organize an ad hoc group of experts to consider a comprehensive
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global treaty to conserve biological diversity. There were already many
treaties dealing with protection of individual species, but there was no
agreement dealing with the more complicated question of protecting ecological
systems as a whole and biological diversity more generally.
The UNEP governing council consented in 1987, initiated international
negotiations in 1991, and proposed an international agreement on biodiversity
preservation at the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. The agreement
received wide-scale support and 150 countries, including Canada, Japan, the
European Community, and all of its member states, signed. The Biodiversity
Convention entered into force in December 1993 after obtaining the requisite
number of signatories. As of May 2004, there were 188 parties to the
Convention (United Nations Environment Programme, n. d). Noticeably
missing from this list is the US even though it was an initial sponsor of the
agreement.
The Biodiversity Convention is intended to slow species extinction through
conservation practices and the promotion of economic development based on
sustainable use of ecological systems. The richest areas in terms of biological
diversity tend to be in developing countries where many species have yet to
even be identified and documented. Beyond the moral arguments for
preservation of species, species protection is important for its hidden secrets.
These benefits may include new foods, medicines, and materials as well as
genetic diversity. It is precisely because of these potential properties that
pharmaceutical and agricultural companies in the north have an interest in
maintaining access to the biological diversity of the south.
The Biodiversity Convention aims to expand the information base related to
biological diversity and requires nations to develop national biodiversity
strategies and action plans and indicators for measuring trends in biodiversity.
Under the George H. W. Bush administration, the US failed to ratify the
convention due to the pharmaceutical industriesʼ concerns about the
conventionʼs provisions dealing with biotechnology regulations and intellectual
property rights. Also problematic for the Bush administration were the equity
notions found within the agreement that could mean large transfers of funding
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and know-how to developing countries (Raustiala, 1997). While William J.
Clinton took a different stance on the agreement and signed it in 1993, the
convention was never brought before the full Senate for a vote, and thus, has
never been ratified. Opposition to the convention in the Senate stems from
concerns about ownership of intellectual property, financial and technological
transfer demands, and property rights issues.
Since ratifying the convention, Japan, European states, and the EU have
developed national strategies on biological diversity. The EU adopted a goal of
halting biodiversity loss within its member states by 2010 (a goal that was not
met). A major element of the EUʼs strategy was enhancing the development of
indicators and monitoring techniques related to biodiversity conservation and
making these open to the public (European Environment Agency, 2004).
Japanʼs National Strategy on Biological Diversity was released in 1995. It did
not have a concrete goal to halt biodiversity loss by a particular date but
promoted monitoring, research, and surveys; the strengthening of protective
measures; and the addition of new protected and conservation areas (Council
of Ministers for Global Environmental Conservation, Government of Japan,
1995). The Japanese government also established new funding institutions and
mechanisms to support conservation efforts in developing countries. At the
2010 Nagoya Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity several new goals were established, including cutting in at least half
the loss of natural habitats, expanding nature reserves to 17 percent of global
land area by 2020 (up from about 13 percent today) and expanding marine
reserves from one percent to about ten percent of the worldʼs seas. Countries
are also required to draw up national biodiversity preservation plans. Finally,
new rules on how countries should share benefits derived from genetic
resources were established. The US is not signatory to the agreement but has
stringent national regulations related to biological conservation.
The Cartegna Protocol on Biosafety
A provision of the Biodiversity Conservation called for an assessment of the
need for a protocol on biosafety. Over the 1990s, as new technologies
developed, scientists, NGOs, and developing countries began to express their
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worries about potential human and environmental harm from genetically
modified (GM) organisms. These groups began to call for establishing an
international agreement that would lay out safety rules governing bio- and
genetic-engineering. European nations began to add their voices to the calls for
a biosafety protocol. In 1995 an ad hoc Working Group on Biosafety was set up
by the conference of the parties to the Biodiversity Convention. After four
years of contentious negotiations, the Cartegna Protocol on Biosafety, a
supplement to the Biodiversity Convention was agreed upon (Cosbey and
Burgiel, 2000; Gupta, 2000). It went into effect in 2003. The protocol gives
member states the right to signal if they are willing or opposed to the import of
GM products. They must communicate their concerns, and the basis for those
concerns, through the BioSafety Clearing House.
Japan, the EU, and all EU member states have ratified the Cartegna Protocol.
In Europe where there is strong public distrust of genetically modified (GM)
organisms, there was strong public demand for the Cartegna Protocol and
acquiescence on the part of the agricultural industry, which has not been
widely involved in testing or manufacturing GM products. In contrast, the US,
Canada, Australia, and Argentina have not ratified the agreement due to the
very strong opposition coming from their agricultural lobbies and a lesser level
of concern shown by their publics related to GM products (United Nations
Environment Programme, Convention on Biological Diversity, n.d.; Le Prestre,
2002; Meyer 2010). Japan was considered to be a member of what has been
dubbed the “compromise group” (Japan, Norway, Switzerland, Mexico, and
South Korea) in the negotiations. Thus, the Japanese government supported
GMO trade (as the US wanted), but recognized the need for safety restrictions
(as the EU and developing countries demanded) (Gupta, 2000). The dispute
has major implications for developing countries (Bernauer and Aerni 2009).
In sum, the EU has joined developing countries in support of the Convention
on Biological Diversity and the related Cartegna Protocol on Biosafety. Japan
has played a supportive, if not proactive role in their development.
Global Climate Change
The US was initially a supporter of establishing an international agreement
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to address global warming. The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) as negotiated at the UNCED in 1992 recognized
global climate change as a serious problem and called upon the developed
nations, which are responsible for the majority of the anthropogenic
greenhouse gases that have accumulated in the atmosphere, to take action first
to reduce their emissions and to aid developing countries. Canada, Japan, the
US, and the European Community all signed the agreement in Rio de Janeiro
and ratified it in the following 18 months. The US was the first country to ratify
the convention, which is simply a broad state of concern about climate change.
The UNFCC established a Conference of the Parties that was given the
mandate of formulating a protocol that would spell out specific measures to be
taken to protect the planet from global warming. After five years and
considerable disagreement, the EU, the US, and Japan negotiated the Kyoto
Protocol. Going into the negotiations, there were considerable disagreements
among the industrialized northern states.
As Japan was eager to see a successful agreement negotiated, especially as
the agreement would carry the name of the countryʼs ancient capital, Japanese
negotiators worked hard to find a compromise position among the participating
states (Tiberghien and Schreurs, 2010). By the end of the difficult negotiations,
the US had agreed to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 7 percent of 1990
levels by 2008-12. The EU accepted an 8 percent reduction with differentiated
targets for each of its then 15 member states. Canada took on a 6 percent
reduction target. Under pressure as the host nation, Japan agreed to a 6
percent reduction target over the same time frame, more than the economics
ministry wanted to accept (Harrison and McIntosh-Sundstrom, 2010).
The Kyoto Protocol, however, was never presented to the US Senate for
ratification because of strong opposition there to the agreement on the grounds
that it did not ask developing countries to participate in sufficiently meaningful
ways (Harris, 2000). Opponents argued that it would cost the US economy too
much to implement and would put US industry at a competitive disadvantage
with industries in developing countries. Initially, individual EU member states,
EU delegates, and Japan tried to persuade the US back into the agreement
with suggestions of further compromises.
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After it became clear that the US was not planning to change its position, the
EU decided to move forward in its efforts to win sufficient support for the
protocol to become binding even without US participation. After some initial
wavering, Japan, Canada, and Russia sided with the EU (Schreurs 2002;
Kawashima 2003). Canada, Japan and the EU ratified the Kyoto Protocol in
2002 and Russia in 2004. The Kyoto Protocol came into force in 2005.
The US as a Veto Player
The US is widely recognized as an early pioneer, a kind of leader in the
introduction of national environmental statutes and programs. Many pioneer-
ing ideas originated in the US, including national parks, environmental impact
assessments (as first required by the National Environmental Protection Act
of 1969), and emissions trading. The US was also a driving force behind the
formation of numerous early international environmental agreements, such as
the Convention on the Law of the Seas, CITES, and the Montreal Protocol.
The reason for early US leadership had to do with the strength of the nationʼs
science community as well as its environmental groups. There was also a
proactive Congress that was able to reach cross-party compromises. US
environmental groups were eager to spread their conservation norms
internationally. US economic actors worked to level the international playing
field in which they had to operate by taking national laws and policy
approaches and shifting them up to the international level (DeSombre 2000).
In the case of the Montreal Protocol, the development of substitute chemicals to
CFCs by the US manufacturer, DuPont, for example, was important. The
economic interests of important U.S. actors “fit” with the development of a
global environmental agreement.
Yet, by the 1990s, US global environmental leadership was no longer so
strongly apparent. The US began to distance itself from a growing number of
global environmental agreements (Sussman 2004; DeSombre 2010). Various
possible explanations for this can be considered. One is a shift in the US political
culture towards a more neo-conservative political agenda, that put security
interests and traditional economic concerns above policy areas that are more
commonly associated with neo-liberal political agendas, including social
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welfare, gender equality, or environmental protection. The willingness of
Democrats and Republicans to work across party lines also weakened making
it difficult to achieve the kinds of majorities necessary to pass domestic
environmental reforms (a simple majority, but also the 60 votes necessary to
break a filibuster) let alone ratification of international environmental
agreements (which requires a two-thirds majority in the Senate). Another is
the growing sophistication of the use of the media by anti-Kyoto, anti-UN, and
anti-multilateral groups to “frame” the publicʼs understanding of issues. The
US is developing an anti-scientific political culture. The rather successful
lobbying activities of economic interests that wish to protect the status quo and
that are averse to government intervention in the economy have succeeded in
creating a stalemate in Congress. The result has been that the US has become a
veto player on numerous global environmental and other matters.
US resistance has another dimension to it as well. It has to do with questions
of where the largest future emissions are expected to be coming from and
concerns about an uneven economic playing field that will weaken industry if
the US is expected to act to reduce emissions or enforce particular
environmental standards without similar expectations being placed on
developing country industries. Many of the global agreements that have been
formulated so far place the heaviest burden for change on the developed
countries. Skeptics have used this to block policy action. They demand that
rapidly transitioning economies be required to accept emissions and
environmental targets. Until recently, developing countries have strongly
resisted these pressures coming from the US arguing that it is North America
and Europe that are responsible for most of the historical emissions and natural
resource degradation experienced so far. They have argued strongly that the
right to development cannot be hindered by environmental requirements.
There are, however, some signs of a growing willingness to discuss possible
future requirements for action as normative and economic interests change in
transitioning countries.
Europeʼs Efforts to Lead
More than any other region, it is Europe that has stepped into the void
Global Environmental Problems, US Unilateralism, and Japanese,
Canadian and European Responses（Miranda A. Schreurs)
261（84）
opened by the anti-multilateral political tendencies of the US. Europe has
become one of the primary supporters of a broad range of international
environmental agreements that the US has resisted ratifying (Schreurs, Selin,
VanDeveer 2009; Kelemen and Vogel 2010). Lack of US participation in these
international environmental agreements has compromised their breadth and
effectiveness (Sussman 2004).
Europe has become an increasingly strong supporter of multi-lateral
approaches to environmental problem solving. There are several important
reasons. One comes from the EUʼ s own need to deal with its many
transboundary environmental issues among its member states and its closely
affiliated neighbors. Relatedly, EU institutions have developed considerable
competency and agenda setting influence on environmental matters. Over the
course of the 1980s and 1990s, the environmental capacity and authority of the
European Community was greatly enhanced. The enactment of the 1986 Single
European Act, for the first time explicitly gave the European Community legal
competency in environmental matters. This authority was institutionalized in
the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and subsequent EU legislation. This meant that
the European Commission could actively develop environmental legislation
that affected the entire community and press member states to comply with
Community regulations and directives. The strengthening over time of the role
of the European Parliament where green interests are quite strong has further
enhanced the push for a proactive environmental policy. In addition, there is a
generally strong club of environmentally-minded member states, albeit with a
shifting membership depending on the issue being addressed and the domestic
political situation at any given time. They have helped to push Europe more
strongly into a global environmental leadership role (Schreurs and Tiberghien,
2010; Würzel and Connelly 2011). Domestically, Europe also has gone farthest
with implementing new environmental policies and standards and promoting
more fundamental changes in how the relationship between the economy and
the environment are understood.
Japan and Canada: Ambivalent Middle Players
Japan too became far more engaged in proactive global environmental
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policymaking in the 1990s than it was in the 1980s. Although its environmental
community was very active in the 1970s, it failed to form large national or
international environmental groups and remained domestically focused. Japan
was perceived in the 1980s as an international laggard in global (as opposed to
domestic) environmental protection matters, especially those that pertained to
wildlife protection and nature conservation. By the 1990s, Japanʼs position on
environmental matters shifted and the country started to become far more
active in international environmental protection. Given Japanʼs traditional close
relationship to the US and its propensity to follow the US in foreign policy
matters, it is noteworthy that Japan joined agreements that the US did not.
Increasingly, Japan has chosen to side with the EU on global environmental
policymaking, but has been more reluctant than the EU to criticize too strongly
US non-participation. Japan has fashioned for itself the role of a mediator
between the US and the EU, shaping international environmental agreements
in ways that could make eventual US participation in those agreements easier.
The reasons for Japanʼ s more proactive position on global environmental
matters include both an interest on the part of a political leadership eager to
enhance Japanʼ s foreign policy role and a bottom-up push for stronger
environmental regulations (both from the environmental community and a
business community that began to see possibilities in environmental pollution
control and alternative energy technologies). Long years of recession and the
aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster raise questions, however, of how
much progressive activity in the international environmental arena can be
expected from Japan in the coming years. Japan may for a time focus on the
dramatic needs of its own economy and energy system before it considers how
this might fit into a larger global picture.
Canada, like Japan, has a historically close relationship to the US and is its
single most important trading partner and source of energy and raw materials.
Much Canadian foreign policy follows that of the US. Canada and the US began
to diverge in their approaches to international environmental protection in the
1980s, over the contentious issue of acid rain. Whereas Canada became a strong
proponent of the Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention and its
protocols designed to control the precursors of acid rain, the US was resistant
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to European and Canadian calls for the establishment of protocols that would
limit levels of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions. This issue was
eventually solved within the framework of a bilateral acid rain agreement and
the introduction in the US of a sulfur dioxide emissions trading system. In the
1990s, Canada joined the EU in ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and Biodiversity
Convention (although not the Cartegna Protocol on Biosafety) despite the U.S.
failure to ratify these conventions. Thus, for a time it appeared that a new
coalition of states might form to place pressures on the US to back away from
its unilateralism and join the new multilateral environmental agreements. But,
there has not been consistency among these states. Domestic politics, and in
particular the different perspectives of various Canadian provinces on
agricultural and energy issues, has pushed Canada back in a direction more
similar to that of the US in recent years. Whereas in the 1990s, it appeared that
Canada was shifting towards an EU position on the Kyoto Protocol, by the
2000s, Canadaʼs position was again leaning in the direction of the US. Canada
continues to resist the Cartegna Protocol on Biosafety and announced its
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol.
What is Leadership Without Followers ?
Europe has tried to find ways to circumvent U.S. non-participation in key
global agreements. It has done this by forging coalitions with other key states.
This strategy has had some success. Yet, the limits to this strategy are
becoming increasingly apparent as well. Without the US on board, the
effectiveness of global environmental agreements is compromised. And US
participation remains uncertain. It is linked to strong economic lobbies.
The difficulties of achieving progress on international environmental
agreements without a fully committed US and a reluctant China and India have
been painfully apparent in the climate change case. Going into the Copenhagen
climate negotiations in December 2009, the EU was eager and confident in its
role as a global leader on climate change and optimistic that a successor
agreement to the Kyoto Protocol would be forged. During the negotiations,
however, the EU was in many regards sidelined as the US and China along
with other BASIC countries (Brazil, India, and South Africa) resisted
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European efforts to form a binding agreement with national emission control
targets. They instead hammered out an agreement that includes only
voluntary emissions targets with no legal force. By the end of the negotiations,
the question began to be raised, ʻcan the EU be a leader, if no one follows?ʼ
In Durban, South Africa at the 17th meeting of the Conference of the Parties
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the EU was
able to avoid a total collapse of the Kyoto Protocol process, but Canada pulled
out and Japan and Russia announced they would take on no new greenhouse
gas emission requirements under a second phase of the agreement. The
protocol has thus basically been kept alive in order to keep the Kyoto flexibility
mechanisms that provide an avenue for providing assistance to developing
countries on climate change in place while negotiations to find some kind of
new arrangement for a more encompassing climate agreement continue. In
Durban, an agreement was reached to keep negotiating. The Durban Platform
acknowledged the need for a new global agreement that includes both
developed and developing countries and that this agreement should be
concluded by 2015 and go into force by 2020. No details of what this agreement
might contain were mentioned. It is also unclear whether states will in the end
agree to ratification.
What Alternative Strategies Exist ?
The 2012 Rio+20 Conference was held with the recognition that despite 40
years of global environmental protection efforts, the race to protect the planet
is not being won. Global environmental agreements have done little to stop
rapidly growing greenhouse gas emissions, unprecedented rates of species
extinctions, wide spread loss of natural ecosystems, and depletion of natural
resources. A certain level of fatigue tied to the negotiations and shifting
expectations in relation to what can be achieved through them is resulting in a
new kind of environmental politics, one that is more decentralized, involves a
wider variety of actors, is more scattered, and focused on smaller parts of the
big picture. There is, in other words, growing attention to alternative means of
stimulating change――among them a focus on green growth――at the same
time that efforts to keep the international negotiations and agreements moving
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forward continue.
The Rio+20 negotiations are taking a different focus than past international
environmental conferences. Rio + 20 is not about forging new international
environmental agreements. It is about trying to change the problems that are
at the root cause of many of the global environmental issues discussed above.
These have to do with economies that are based on greenhouse gas intensive
energy structures, consumption patterns that are unsustainable, and wasteful
use of resources. Rio+20 has placed a new emphasis on finding ways to shift
economic structures in “greener” directions, through the promotion of
renewable energies, the encouragement of energy and resource efficiency, and
the development of circular economies where resource reuse and recycling are
integrated into product design and development.
Here a new divide may be emerging internationally, where Europe and
Japan――for different reasons--may take on new kinds of leadership roles.
Europe has set out on a course of structural transformation domestically in
response to its concerns about global environmental problems. It has
established goals to reduce its carbon dioxide emissions by 80-95 per cent of
1990 levels by 2050 with an interim CO2 reduction goal of 20 per cent of 1990
levels by 2020. In addition, it plans to improve energy efficiency and build out
renewable energies to 20 per cent of total primary energy by 2020. It has
developed new sustainability indicators and a 2020 strategy for developing a
resource efficient economy. These policy strategies have as their background
goal making the European economy greener, more sustainable and more
competitive. There are, of course, many obstacles that still need to be
addressed or overcome――such as different perspectives on nuclear energy
and carbon capture and sequestration. Nevertheless, there is a relatively solid
understanding that Europeʼs future must be one based on a model that is low
resource and energy intensive and protective of natural ecological systems.
In Japan, the implications of the Fukushima nuclear disaster are still
unfolding. Already, however, paths of change are evident. It is likely that Japan
will eventually greatly reduce and possibly phase out the use of nuclear
energy. Energy conservation measures that have been taken in response to the
shortages of electricity tied to the shutting down of virtually its entire nuclear
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capacity in the year following Fukushima are likely to make Japan once again a
global leader in energy efficiency processes and technologies. Perhaps more in
response to crisis than to strong domestic demand for the development of a
sustainable economy, Japan may also emerge as a leader in transforming their
economy in a more sustainable direction. They are already highly efficient in
their industrial use of energy and resources.
There are, of course, also many similar developments at the sub-national
levels in both Canada and the US. Many states and provinces are promoting
renewable energies, sustainable communities, and greener economic struc-
tures. At the sub-national level, a dissatisfaction with national environmental
politics is evident. Yet, the lack of federal leadership――due to the strong
interests tied to the fossil fuel industries in both countries――means that at
least for the time being, it is in Europe and possibly in Japan that new more
sustainable economic models are emerging.
What will be determining for the future is which direction countries like
India and China go. In both countries, there are also strong fossil fuel interests
and dependencies and much energy and resource inefficiency. The demands of
their huge populations, energy security concerns, and the severe pollution
problems affecting them, mean that in both awareness of the need to improve
energy and resource efficiency and control pollution has taken root. Various
efforts are being made to make their economies less polluting. In both, there
has also been growing interest in renewable energies. Should China and India
choose to shift more strongly and ambitiously in the direction of sustainability,
then the future of the planet may look a little brighter.
Conclusion
A look back at international environmental agreements over 40 years shows
several important patterns. First, the US exhibited a leadership role in the
development of international environmental agreements in the 1970s and into
the early 1980s. Yet, on a growing number of issues, the US has shunned
participation in multilateral agreements that have been opposed domestically
by special interests. While it often continues to be involved in international
scientific research in the areas under question, it has resisted ratifying
Global Environmental Problems, US Unilateralism, and Japanese,
Canadian and European Responses（Miranda A. Schreurs)
255（90）
agreements that would affect US economic interests. In some cases, it signed
the agreements, but then failed to ratify them; in other cases, it neither signed,
nor ratified.
Second, the EU has taken on an increasingly proactive environmental foreign
policy since the mid-1980s. This is due to a combination of factors, including a
growing number of green-leaning states in the EU; the greening of public
opinion; the strengthening over time of EU institutions; experience gained from
EU harmonization of environmental regulations being brought up to the
international level; a political culture that encourages consultative decision-ma-
king practices among business, government, and NGOs, and; a desire to
develop the environmental area as an area of foreign policy strength.
Japan took on an increasingly proactive environmental foreign policy in the
late-1980s/early 1990s. This has resulted in shifts in Japanʼs position on various
international environmental agreements from initial ambivalence or resistance
to eventual support. On a growing number of issues, it has taken the same
broad position that the EU has on international environmental matters but has
often disagreed with the EU on the specifics of policy measures and approaches
to policy implementation. On issues ranging from climate change to
biodiversity preservation and genetically modified organisms, there are strong
policy differences across the Atlantic. Japanʼ s support of the EU on these
matters has made it possible to keep these international environmental
agreements from falling apart once the US, and sometimes Canada, expressed
its/their clear opposition to them. Japan, moreover, has helped make it possible
for the EU to claim international environmental leadership. The Japanese
government has been reluctant, however, to be too blatant in its criticism of the
US. Instead it has tried to take on the role of international broker between the
EU and the US, often championing positions that Japanese negotiators felt
would be favorable to US interests were the US to eventually join the
agreements or try to work in parallel with them.
This middle of the road position between the EU and the US reflects a
division within the Japanese bureaucracy between the Environment Ministry
which often takes environmental positions closer to that supported by the EU
and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, which tends to support
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positions more similar to that of the US.
Canada has also increasingly sided with the EU on international environmen-
tal agreements although it is still a somewhat ambivalent actor. Canada and the
US tend to share similar positions on environmental issues affecting
agriculture. Moreover, despite the different positions they initially took in
relation to the Kyoto Protocol, on the ground, Canadian and US policy did not
look so different as there was little evidence that the Kyoto Protocol was being
enforced and in the end Canada withdrew from it. Canada has become
something of a hostage to its new found oil wealth. The development of the tar
sands in Canada has turned the country into one of the greatest CO2 emitters
on the planet. How Canada deals domestically with the paradox between its
desire to be perceived as a champion of sustainable development and the
realities of a heavily polluting, resource intensive country will in the end
determine how Canada behaves in relation to the climate change case.
Global environmental agreements remain important in terms of their
normative influence and pressures they exert to introduce more stringent
ecological standards. As long as the domestic political culture in the US
remains strongly polarized and the influence of multilateral skeptics stays
strong, future full participation of the US in key global environmental
agreements that it has not yet ratified should not be expected. In the meantime,
Europe is unilaterally moving forward with the goal of providing a new more
sustainable economic model that other countries may choose to follow whether
this occurs inside or outside of an international agreement. After Fukushima
world, Japan too may develop a far more energy and resource efficient
economy――a reaction to the largest crisis faced by the nation since the end of
World War II. Interestingly, Canada, Japan, and to a weaker extent the EU are
now also agreeing with the US on calling for more meaningful participation by
developing countries in an international climate agreement.
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